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A Critique of the Dynastic Model
ABSTRACT
In this paper, I show that, under relatively weak conditions,
dynastic equilibria are never welfare optima. If a social planner sets
policy to maximi.ze a social welfare function, then, except in extreme
cases where the planner cares only about a single generation, successive
generations will never be linked through altruistically motivated
transfers.This suggests that the dynastic model is unsuitable for
normative analysis, and, to the extent governments actually behave in
this manner, the model is also inappropriate for positive analysis. In
addition, I show that, except in a few special cases, the planner's
preferences are dynamically inconsistent. If the planner can







A substantial body of recent research hasestablishedthat a
variety of importantissues concerning national savings policy hinge
critically upon the nature of economic relationships within families.
If, in particular, parents and children are linked by altruistically
motivated resource transfers, then each family may behave as though it
is a single, infinite lived, "dynastic" unit. This observation hasa
variety of implications, including the well-known Ricardian equivalence
theorem (see Barro [1974]).
Although the dynastic framework has become a standard analytical
tool for applied theorists, particularly in the areas ofpublic finance
and macroeconomics, it has also been criticized on a variety ofgrounds.
Many economists have challenged the empirical relevance of this
framework (see e.g. Feldstein [1976] and Buiter and Tobin [1981]), while
others have noted certain logical difficulties (seee.g. Bernheim and
Bagwell 11987] and Abel and l3ernheim 119861).
In this paper, I discuss a new criticism of the dynastic model:
under relatively weak conditions, I show that dynastic equilibriaare
never welfare optima. If the social planner sets policy to maximize a
social welfare function, then, except in extreme cases where the planner
cares only about a single generation, successive generations will never
be linked through altruistically motivated transfers. To the extentone
believes that the government does not behave in this manner, the
dynastic model remains a legitimate tool for positive analysis. It is,
however, unsuitable for normative analysis. Accordingly, studies which—2—
contemplateoptimal government policies while uBitaining dynastic
assumptions (see e.g. Judd [1985] and Chamley[19851) may lack internal
coherence.
The intuition for this result is quite simple. Supposethat the
social planner places some weight on the well—beingof two successive
generations. In a dynastic equilibrium,the older generation is
indifferentabout marginal transfers to the younger generation.But the
planner will attach some importance tothe younger generation's strict
preferencefor receiving such transfers. Welfare optimal intergene—
rational resource distribution can therefore beattained only if the
planner first drives the older generationto a corner, and then
undertakes additionaltransfers.!"
In the abstract, this result is not new: similararguments have
been used to draw related conclusions in other contexts(see Roberts
[19841 and Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers figssl).Yet certain
peculiar aspects of the dynastic problemwarrant further probing.
Specifically, except in a few special cases,the planner's preferences
are dynamically inconsistent. Resolutionof this inconsistency requires
that, at each point in time, the plannerbehaves as though he continues
to place weight on the well—being of past(deceased) generations. This
fundamentally alters the nature of his problem.
I assume that the planner discounts the stream ofutilities from
successive generations at the rate p, whileindividuals discount the
stream of felicities at the rate 5. Lettingthe number of prior
generations go infinity, I findthat the welfare optimum convergesto—3—
the dynastic equilibrium if and only if iS>p. Accordingly, the
dynastic model turns out to be an appropriate normative tool as long as
(i) the planner never disregards the preferences of deceased
generations, and (ii) individuals do not discount felicity more rapidly
than the government discounts utility. If, on the other
hand, p > 5, dynastic equilibria will always involve excessive levels of
currentconsumption relative to the limiting welfare optima. Indeed, as
long as S < p, changes in the level of private altruism have absolutely
noeffect on the planner's preferences.
The paper is organized as follows. I describe the model is
section 2. Section 3 contains the basic criticism of the dynastic
framework, along with a discussion of dynamic consistency. In section
4, I discuss the relationship between dynastic equilibria and welfare
optima in an economy where the planner successfully resolves dynamic
inconsistency.
2. The Model
The economy considered here corresponds quite closely to that
analyzed by Barro [1974]. There is an infinite sequence of periods,
labelled t =0,1,2,...,as well as an infinite sequence of consumers,
which I also label t =0,1,2,...in order to emphasized the fact that
generation t is born in period t. Each generation lives for two
periods. Accordingly, two generations are alive in each period, with
the exception of period 0, during which generation 0 is alone. This
special treatment of period 0 is for analytical convenience only (it—4-
allowsme to avoid carrying around special terms forthe "first"
generation); one could easily add an "old" generation in period0.
Generation t is endowed with wealth, wt, in period t. In
addition, it receives a bequest, bt_i, from its immediate predecessor
(without loss of generality, I adopt the convention that b10). In
period t, it divides its resources between consumption,c, and
investment. I assume for simplicity that production isconstant—
returns—to—scalefor capital investments, so that savingyields a fixed
grossreturn,8>1. In period t +1,generation t divides the
procedes from its investments between consumption, c,and a bequest to







In addition, generation t must also respect non—negativity
constraints:
(2) c, c, bt
0
I assume that each generation cares about the infinitestream of
consumption enjoyed by itself and its descendents:
yoy o
ut =u(ct,ct,ct+i,ct+i,...)
I take these functions to be non—paternalistic,and additively
separable. Formally, I assume that thereexists a function v: ]R2 +IR
such that—5—
y0 y0 y 0 (3) u(ct,ct,...)
=v(ct,ct)+
Barro'sanalysis of the Ricardian equivalence theorem introduced a
notion of equilibrium for such environments. In subsequent work, this
notion has been termed a "dynastic" equilibrium. Formally,




subjectto (1) and (2).
Note that in a dynastic equilibrium, (c,c) must solve, for
each t,
y 0 maxv(ct,ct) y 0
ct,ct
y —1 0'y —V'o subject to c +8c =c+8 c










(6) Ct,bt > 0
Thissolution, <Ct,bt>to, corresponds exactly to a dynastic
equilibrium, in the sense that =c
+ Henceforth, we will
work with this "reduced form" notion of an equilibrium.
This definition becomes still more familiar if an equilibrium has








That is, whenever transfers are positive for all generations,
is simply the solution to a standard programming problem. At this
point, it is useful to define
{<c>0 I(8)and (9) aresatisfied}
I note for future reference that S is compact in the product
topology. I will use C to denote an element of S.—7—
Throughout, I nke the following additional assumptions on
preferences.
Assumption 1: V is differentiable, monotonically increasing,
strictly concave, and satisfies urn v'(c) =+, urnv'(c) =0,and
c+O C+co
v(o)> —.
Allaspects of assumption I are standard, except the final restriction,
which places a lower bound on the dynastic optimization problem. One
can dispense with this lower bound at the cost of some additional,
tedious analysis in section 4, below. Note that the more traditional
restrictions on V guarantee that consumption is strictly positive in
all periods.
Assumption 2:58 < I
This condition is also standard, and guarantees that the dynastic
optimization problem is bounded above. Under assumptions I and 2, one
can demonstrate that the objective function in (7) is continuous over
S in the product topology. Accordingly, the solution to (7) is well—
defined.
Before proceding, it is worthwhile to reflect beiefly on the
justification for using this notion of an equilibrium. It is easy to
demonstrate that a dynastic equilibrium is subgame perfect (see Selten
11965, 19751).. However, Gale 119851 has shownthatit is not the only
subgame perfect equilibrium for this model. Indeed, there is a
continuum of subgame perfect outcomes, and one cannot discard these—8—
alternative solutions on the basisofany natural criterion, such as
dominance. Why then focus on dynastic equilibria?
There are at least three reasons for doing so. First, the
strategic structure of a dynastic equilibrium is particularly simple——
each agent simply expects thateveryonewill act to maximize the
dynastic welfare function, and assumes that this is common knowledge.
Other equilibria involve more complex history—dependent punishments.
Since all generations can never meet to discuss strategies, it seems
unlikely that such complex strategic behavior will arise. Second,the
dynastic equilibrium is analytically convenient, since it corresponds
to the solution of a simple programming nroblem. Third, dynastic
equilibria have certain well—known properties, such as Ricardian
equivalence. Other refinements of the equilibrium set may or maynot
have these properties, depending upon whether punishments remain
feasible after policy changes (see BernheimandBagwell r1987 and
O'Connell and Zeldes r1986]). While the second and third points do not
validate the dynastic concept, they no doubt account for part of its
popularity as an analytic device (see e.g. Judd [19851).
I now turn from consumers to the social planner. The planner has










(notethat he is not bound by the non—negativity constraint on
transfers).
So far, there is no guarantee that the sum in equation (10)
converges. I therefore impose
Assumption 3 There exists T and nwithn<I such that
T
forall I >T.
Again,standard arguments suffice to establish that, under assumption
3, 4 is continuous on S in the product topology, and therefore
achieves a maximum (the reasons for this will perhaps become clearer at
the beginning of section 3).
Our objective in subsequent sections Is to determine the relation-
ship between dynastic equilibria and welfare optima.
3.Difficultieswiththe Dynastic Concept
In many instances, dynasticmodels have been used to study optimal
public policy. The main result ofthis section suggests that, quite—10—
generally, the preceding sentence is logically inconsistent, since the
optimum necessarily entails the use of policies which lead to a
violation of the basic dynastic assumptions.
I begin by deriving through recursive substitution a direct
expression for the utility of generation t:
(13) ut =
T=t
By assumption, this sumconvergeson S. Next, I write out the
planner's objective function explicitly in terms of consumption. Since




(where subscripts denote partial derivatives) for all t, I can, as
before, simplify by expressing welfare as a function of
T-t = v(c) — t=0T=t
(14)
=pttt)t) T=O t=0
(one cannowsee the basis for my claim that assumption 3 bounds
achievable social welfare on s).
Suppose now that we have some dynastic equilibrium,
First order conditions imply that
(15) v'(c) =—11—
wherever bt > 0. Suppose further thatPt > 0 for some t > 0.
















(where the second equality follows from substituting equation (15)).
Accordingly, <>=couldnot be a welfare optimum. We have therefore
proven:
Theorem I: Suppose that p > 0 for some T>0. Let
<ct,bt>to be a dynastic equilibrium. If b11 > 0, then this
equilibrium is not a welfare optimum.—12—
The intuition for this result is extremely simple. When
> 0, generation T —Imust be indifferent between the
consumption of t —Iand T, as must all prior generations.
However, T strictly prefers to receive and consume a larger bequest.
Future generations are simply indifferent. Since the planner attaches
positive weight to T' well—being, he must also prefer such a
redistribution.
Theorem I has an immediate and important corollary:
Corollary 1: Suppose that Pt> 0 for all t.
be a dynastic equilibrium. If <C>0 is a welfare optimun, then
bt=O forall t.
Thus, in the standard case where the planner cares about every
generation directly, successive generations would never be linked
through operative transfers.
Onemight,of course, take the view that the planner is an elected
government, and that this government should only represent the
preferencesof its current constituency. One might then argue that it
is appropriate to take P0 =1and Pt =0for t > 0 in period 0.
P1
=1and =0fort> 1 inperiod 1, and so forth. This would
indeedvalidate the dynastic framework. However, this argument is
faulty. In general, several generations coexist in each period, and the
government should be somewhat responsive to each of these. This is
precisely why I formulated the problem in the context of an overlapping
generations model: one would, at a minimum, expect to have p0 and—13—
p1 strictly positive in period 0 (similarly in subsequent periods).
As long as the concurrent government is responsive to both living
generations in every period, one should never observe positive private
transfers from old to young.
In the following section, I provide a partial resolution to the
problem described above. I motivate this resolution somewhat indirectly
by, perhaps paradoxically, introducing a second problem. This concerns
dynamic consistency. Normative policy analyses which employ the dynamic
framework typically proceed by assuming that the social planner acts to
maximize welfare through an optimal sequence of choices. If the
planner's objectives are dynamically inconsistent, then this prescrip-
tion is inappropriate, since the planner should rationally anticipate
future deviations from the plan which appears optimal at each instant.
I will consider two different notions of dynamic consistency. The
appropriateness of each notion depends upon whether one takes the social
planner to be a representative government (as in the immediately
preceding discussion), or a "social architect." I elaborate on this
distinction below.
The program which maximizes (10) subject to (3) and (12) satisfies
stationary dynamic consistency if, for all t, the continuation program
maximizes
T=tTtT
This corresponds to the notion of dynamic consistency proposed by Strotz
t19561 and Pollak rig6el.Alternatively,the program which maximizes—14—
(10) subject to (3) and (12) satisfies non—stationary dynamic
consistency if, for all t, the continuation program maximizes
PuTT •r=t
It is useful to think first about these notions of dynamic
consistency in the case where iS=0(i.e., all generations are
selfish). Strotz's well known result establishes that the maximizing
program satisfies stationary dynamic consistency if and only if the
welfare weights are geometric, i.e.
t
Pt =P
for some P C[0,1),and for all t. In contrast, the maximizing
program always satisfies non—stationary dynamic consistency when
iS =0.
When are these two notions appropriate? If we think of the
planner as a government which responds to current political pressures,
then, unless the relative political strengths of old and young change
systematically over time, stationary dynamic consistency is relevant.
If the maximizing program does not satisfy stationary dynamic
consistency, then a current government cannot count on its successor to
persue the same objectives by continuing the same policies. Successive
governments will then be forced to treat policy formation as a strategic
problem.
If, on the other hand, we think of the planner as a social
architect, such as an infinitely lived dictator (i.e. a true dynasty,in—15—
the original sense of the world), then non—stationary dynamic
consistency is relevant. The planner simply attaches weights to
specific generations, and these relative weights do not change as time
passes. However, if the planner's objective function does not satisfy
non—stationary dynamic consistency, he may not be able to stick to an
optimalplan chosen in period 0. In particular, he would have an
incentive to deviate from this plan insubsequent periods on the theory
thatwhat previous (deceased) generationsdon't know can't hurt them.
Anticipatingsuch thinking at time 0, he would then act strategically
visa vis himself, in general choosing an action which is inconsistent
withunconstrained maximization of (10).
Unfortunately, in the presence of altruism (t5 > 0), the planner's
problem is almost always dynamically inconsistent, in both senses. I
establish this through two theorems.
Theorem 2: The maximizing program satisfies stationary dynamic








Proof: Noting from equation (14) that4' isadditively
separable, we apply Strotz' [19561well—knowntheorem to conclude that—16—










for all t > 0. Pt > 0 implies > 6. Substituting t =0into (16)
yields =k.The constraint that =I thenimplies that
k=(1—y)/(i—6).This establishes necessity. Sufficiency is
trivial. Q.E.D.
Notethat,for stationary dynamic consistency to hold, the
planner's welfare weights must decline geometrically after generation
0, but that generation 0 must receive extra weight. I should also
emphasize that the planner's problem is never dynamically consistent in
the stationary sense for the class of welfare functions satisfying
p0+p1=1
and =0for t > 1,andthat, within an overlapping generations
framework, this is the most natural class of welfare functions for a
representative government.
I now turn to the second notion of dynamic consistency.(18)
Proof: Note that
kspt6T_t =5ptT_t




or, dividing by S
to consider.
Then, by (18), Pt =0for all t < a.
Then, by (18), Pt =0for all t > s.
1. Using (18), we see that for all T > 5,
t+1 r+1









Theorem 3: The nximizing program satisfies non—stationary
dynamic consistency if and only if there exists some t* such that
pt* +P÷ =I
and P =0 for t<t* and t>t*+1.
(17) = pt6T_tJcT t=s T=t=s
Dynamic consistency requires that for each s, the weights on
T > s in (17) are proportional to the weights in (14). That is, for






Let t be the smallest t for which Pt is positive (note:
t*maybe o).Thenk 1 for all S >t. Thus, =0for all
s and t satisfying t> s > t*, or, more simply, forall t > t +1.
O.1.D.
This result is extremely ironic. The class of social welfare
functions satisfying non—stationary dynamic consistency include those
functionsdescribed above as "most natural" for a representative
government within an overlapping generations framework. Yet non—
stationary dynamic consistencyis not a relevant concept if one
conceivesof the planner as a representative government. This concept
is appropriate when the planner is a social architect, but in that case,
the class of social welfare functions described in Theorem 3 are
extremelyunnatural.
I conclude that, in the presence of intergenerational altruism,
social dynamic inconsistency is a serious problem regardless of how one
conceives of the planner.
4. AL'ärtial Resolution
Letusreflect foramomenton the plight of the social architect.
In his case, dynamic inconsistency arises not from the fact that
relativewelfare weights change over time, but rather from an inability
to commit in advance to respect the preferences of each generationafter—19—
its demise. In practice, societies maywelldevelop techniques based
upon both laws and customs which allow the planner at each point in time
to restrict his future choices (i.e. through the adoption of a
constitution), and which may therefore alleviate problems stemming from
dynamic inconsistency. I shall not investigate here the nature or
efficacy of such techniques. For the purposes of this study, I simply
assume that considerations of this sort allow the planner to resolve
intertemporal conflicts without loss of efficiency. Accordingly, I look
at first best welfare optima, and compare them with dynastic equilibria.
Yet this discussion suggests that the comparison of equilibria and
optima should be conducted a bit differently than in the preceding
section. Specifically, if the planner continues to respect the
preferences of each generation after its demise, then, in period 0, it
should also recall and respect the preferences of prior generations. As
we shall see, allowing for memory of this sort partially resolves the
problem raised by Theorem 1 (i.e. the divergence of equilibria and
optima).




for some p c (0,1), and for all t. Further, we will assume that the
planner honors the preferences of r past generations, so that the





(note that we are only concerned with the consumptions of generations
t =0,1,•.., eventhough the preferences of prior generations come into








I willassume that we are interested in an economy that has been
operating for quite a long time, so that r is large. Formally, I will
let r go to infinity, and investigate the limiting properties of
yrIn some cases, the welfare function may blow up in the limit.
Since multiplication by a scalar does not change the ordinal properties
of yr it is appropriate in such cases to select a sequence of
scalars, <A > ,suchthat A pr(C) converges on S.
rr=0 r
I now turn to the results.—21—
Theorem4: SupposetS =p.Then r_Yr(C) converges uniformly
onS
Proof:Using (20), we see that
=r1 (r + T + 1)Tv(cT)
t=0
=Tv(c)+ r1(T + l)TV(C)
Under assumptions I and 2, there exists a finite B such that for all
CCS,
—B < (T + 1) Tv(c)<B
r=0
Choose some c > 0. Let R =B/c.For all r > R, we have
!r(C) - < C
for all C C S. Uniform convergence is thereby established. Q.E.D.
The interpretation of Theorem 4 is as follows. If private
individuals discount felicity at the rateCS, and if the planner
discounts utility at the rate CS, then, as r becomes large, the
planner discounts felicity at the rate 5. This result is somewhat
surprising since, for r =0,the planner discounts felicity at a very
different rate. Intuitively, it holds for the following reason. In the
limit, I!r(C) fails to converge, so asymptotically r''(C) places all—22—
of the weight on the preferences of deceased generations. Yet each
generation r < 0 has the same preferences, v(C), regarding
t=0
<Ct>t=O.
Theorem5:Supposep > 5. then (1 —S/p)1't'(C)converges
uniformly5 jptv(c)
Proof: Using (20), we see that
i-Fr










Under assumptions 1 and 2, there exists a finite B such that
—B< Tv(c)<B
•r=0
Choose some > 0. Let R =£n(B/C)/&n(cS/P) .Forall r > R, we
have
1(1 —/)r- tv(C)I < C
t=0
Uniformconvergence is thereby established. Q.E.D.—23—
Theorem 5 tells us that if individuals discount felicity at the
rate 6, the planner discounts utility at the rate p, and p > 6, then,
as r becomes large, the planner discounts felicity at the rate p.
This result is surprising for two reasons. First, p is defined as a
discount factor for utilities, and not felicities. Second, in the limit
the private discount factor 6 completely disappears from the planner's
objective function. Thus, the presence, absence, or degree of private
altruism is completely irrelevant to the planner, as long as altruism is
not too strong (i.e. 6 > p). Since does converge in this case, the
intuition provided following Theorem 4 does not apply.
Theorem 6: Suppose p < 5. Then (1 —/6)(/6)rrconverges
uniformly on S to 6tvtt).







Under assumptions Iand2, there exists a finite B such that
—B < .Tv(c)< B
T=0
Choose some > 0. Let R =£n(B/E)/Ln(6/p).For all r > R. we have—24—
1(1- P/)(P/Wr(C)-tv(C)I<
f or all C CS.Uniform convergence is thereby established. Q.E.D.
Theorem 6 tells us that if individuals discount felicity at the
rate t,theplanner discounts utility at the rate p, and 5 > p, then,
as r becomes large, the planner discounts felicity at the rate.
Thisresult is surprising since, in the limit, the planner ignores his
own discount factor ()entirely.Indeed, his preferences coincide in
the limit with those of generation 0 (the intuition is the same as for
Theorem 4). This suggests that dynastic equilibria are indeed optimal
when 5 > p
To establish that this conclusion is in fact warranted, I argue as
follows. Let C denote the solution to the "dynastic" optimization
problem (i.e. equation (4)), and let C denote the solution to the
same problem when p is substituted for 5. Finally, letr denote
the solution to maximizing (given compactness of S, this is well—
defined under assumptions I and 3). Noting that S is compact and that
convergence of is always uniform over S, we have




Thestriking aspect of this result is that, in the limit, either
p or'5 matters, but not both. In particular, supposing that 6 > p
and taking r large implies that the dynastic equilibrium is
arbitrarily close to a welfare optimum.—25—
From the point of view of a social architect, the optimality of
dynastic equilibria therefore depends upon a comparison of p and 5.
It is important to acknowledge that there is no a priori reason for
expecting that the inequality will go one way or the other. The case of
p = has no particular significance, since p measures relative
weights on utilities, while tmeasuresrelative weights on
felicities. One cannot, for example, appeal to the literature on the
social rate of discount, arguing that, since the government ought to be
more "forward looking" than the private sector, p > 5. In fact, p > 0
is alone sufficient to guarantee that individuals are impatient relative
to the planner.
However, this analysis does provide us with a useful framework for
thinking about the economic importance of intergenerational altruism.
As long as altruism is not too strong, it has absolutely no effect on
the preferences of a social architect, and optimal policy will in
general drive private transfers to zero. On the other hand, if altruism
is sufficiently strong, the social architect's preferences coincide with
those of the oldest generation in every period. A dynastic equilibrium
with operative linkages then generates a first—best optimum.—26-
Footnotes
Technically, the planner could also achieve an optimum through
Pigouvian subsidies, in which case he would not need to drive
successive generations to coerners. In practice, it would be
extremely difficult to implement such a policy, in that the
planner would need to fine tune the subsidy separately for the
degree of altruism in each family (indeed, it may not possess the
necessary information). Note in addition that a policyof
subsidization would also remove us from the traditional dynastic
framework.
One could easily allow to depend upon the current capital
stock, as in standard models. However, this would add an
additional layer of obscurity to the analysis without changing
anything of substance.
Theorem I only requires that 4bestirctly increasing in certain
arguments.-27—
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